Hello Jose We have been using and testing aaPanel for a few months now, so far there have been no complaints, but now there is a serious problem that is caused by an extremely large number of attacks from the network and IP inventory baidu.com and so on is in turn connected to BaoTa which is a fork of BaoTa. This post is about tracking aaPanel https://www.aapanel.com/forum/d/1504-about-the-tracking-code-of-the-aapanel-installation-script/6 So please openly and transparently these tracking codes are used to attack web servers. There is no other way to explain it, 90% of the IPs that attack our systems are from this network and all of our customers are currently experiencing the same problems! So please comment on this

This news is very dangerous for us

[unknown] baidu and bt.cn both are chinese!!!

lol... share more details about the attack (port, dest, layer, examples?). how are you relating these ip's with baota/aapanel? where are the proofs of what you're saying?

We use various tools and we have a firewall from its log, we can see where the attacks come from, plus some other network monitoring tools and you can use this to determine where and from which network the IPs come. https://www.ultratools.com/tools/ipWhoisLookup but we still have many far-reaching options that I do not want to explain further here (company secrets). Source: whois.apnic.netIP Address: 106.12.215.244 % [whois.apnic.net] % Whois data copyright terms http://www.apnic.net/db/dbcopyright.html % Information related to '106.12.0.0 - 106.13.255.255' % Abuse contact for '106.12.0.0 - 106.13.255.255' is ' ipas@cnnic.cn ' inetnum: 106.12.0.0 - 106.13.255.255 netname: Baidu descr: Beijing Baidu Netcom Science and Technology Co., Ltd. descr: Baidu Plaza, No.10, Shangdi 10th street, descr: Haidian District Beijing, 100080 admin-c: SD753-AP tech-c: SD753-AP country: CN mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP mnt-lower: MAINT-CNNIC-AP mnt-irt: IRT-CNNIC-CN mnt-routes: MAINT-CNNIC-AP status: ALLOCATED PORTABLE last-modified: 2015-01-28T09: 58: 01Z source: APNIC irt: IRT-CNNIC-CN address: Beijing, China e-mail: ipas@cnnic.cn abuse-mailbox: ipas@cnnic.cn admin-c: IP50-AP tech-c: IP50-AP auth: # Filtered remarks: Please note that CNNIC is not an ISP and is not remarks: empowered to investigate complaints of network abuse. remarks: Please contact the tech-c or admin-c of the network. mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP last-modified: 2017-11-01T08: 57: 39Z source: APNIC person: Supeng Deng nic-hdl: SD753-AP address: No.6 2nd North Street Haidian District Beijing country: CN phone: + 86-10-58003402 fax-no: + 86-10-58003402 e-mail: zhangyukun@baidu.com mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP last-modified: 2016-11-01T08: 04: 01Z source: APNIC % Information related to '106.12.192.0/18AS38365' route: 106.12.192.0/18 descr: Baidu country: CN origin: AS38365 notify: zhangyukun@baidu.com mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP last-modified: 2017-12-21T08: 06: 02Z source: APNIC % Information related to '106.12.192.0/18AS55967' route: 106.12.192.0/18 descr: Baidu country: CN origin: AS55967 notify: zhangyukun@baidu.com mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP last-modified: 2017-12-21T08: 06: 02Z source: APNIC % This query was served by the APNIC Whois Service version 1.88.15-SNAPSHOT (WHOIS-US4) almost all attacks come from the network from 106.12.0.0 - 106.13.255.255 and a few more of which we trace up to netname: Baidu descr: Beijing Baidu Netcom Science and Technology Co., Ltd. descr: Baidu Plaza, No.10, Shangdi 10th street, descr: Haidian District Beijing, 100080 could trace back, using vpn / proxyserver.

this is just a small excerpt, we can count thousands of attacks from this and last month. almost all of them went from the IP range 106.12.0.0 to 106.12.255.255 from the area of Haidian District Beijing, 100080 2020-06-14 23:48:02 94.102.56.151 Received / blocked user_agent 2020-06-14 23:47:58 94.102.56.151 Received / blocked user_agent 2020-06-14 20:44:14 174.86.121.243 Get /configuration.php.swp Blocked 2020-06-14 20:44:07 84.138.42.168 received /configuration.php blocked url 2020-06-14 20:43:57 19.153.97.227 Obtained /configuration.php.bak Blocked 2020-06-14 20:43:54 108.208.61.1 Get /configuration.php.old Blocked

block this IP class + use Fail2Ban for all services + use CloudFlare to proxy all websites on server

KrzysztofMaciejewski it's about aaPanel being used to hack servers, I can't tell my customers what and who to block, I recommend it to everyone. Do you have any other questions from Germany? Hesse?

i dont see any proof - its normal attack from "friendly" country could happen to anyone

Hello CQT We have no collecting other information other than collecting the installation information stated in the above post. Do you see any attacks against the panel? If it is, I think it is just a normal scanner scan

so because is a chinese ip you think is aapanel the source? .... ok XD anyway i still don't see any proof

Hacking attacks with and through aaPanel

CQT

kaz050457 No it is by no means normal !!

Attacks would normally be 40-100 but not 1000 over a period of several hours.

When we switched the proxy upstream with new IPS, it was just zero attacks. This shows that the IP is tracked and then attacked !!!!!!!!! Since it was then no longer possible to stretch the IPs via the installation

kaz050457

CQT are guys using the default port? Do your server still support TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1?

CQT

kaz050457 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 are activated as standard on our servers, the customer can no longer activate older ones!

gacott

kaz050457 yeah, we are at 1.3 on the servers and we are not using the default port. So they are either sniffing the shit out of these (doubtful) or something is telling them where these installs are, which is most likely IMO.

gacott

So, I did a little test. I just moved that exact same box to another IP. I removed all websites from it, and just let it sit there with the new IP. Less than 24 hours later, it's being attacked.

God, I hate to say it, as I have had a guy working on something SUPER cool for this for over a week now, but until this is figured out, this panel is unusable for us. We can't have IPs keep getting shut down because they are under constant attack.

CQT

gacott Something tells them where these installations are located! And I'm talking about that all the time. As long as that is, I cannot expect this panel from my customers and servers. We had so much to do with it. Well then don't stop. Letting all installations run only via the proxy server, this will soon be down and I don't want that either.

aaPanel_Jose

gacott CQT

I think it may be that the SESSION ID of the panel is set to a special value, which is easy to be scanned to the feature. We will deal with this in the next update.

In addition, the data we have collected will no longer be synchronized to bt.cn, I think it should not be caused by this problem

gacott
In addition, on your server where only the panel is installed, whether the default port of the panel has been changed and whether the ssh port has been changed. Is the sshroot password strong enough?

gacott

Okay, OVH was looking over logs, my box was also being used to carry out attacks. LITERALLY the panel was the only thing installed. Nobody else had access, passwords were good.

CQT

aaPanel_Jose all ports have been changed including SSH, FTP, MySql
and so on, in addition, the password is so strong that it cannot actually be hacked with a supercomputer in 30 years, furthermore we have secured all logins and synchronizations with a certificate. We experimented with another server (aaPanel) installation and let this run from the beginning via a proxy (install.sh). So far not a single attack !!
At what point are the IPs tracked?

CQT

aaPanel_Jose Can you please tell us which IPS have to be whitelisted for aaPanel to work properly, this is very important to me because we are currently writing a module for aaPanel which will lock out the entire ip range and this for all functions and modules.

gacott

aaPanel_Jose Hey man,

Not the default panel port, ssh port is still standard but ssh pass is very strong.

TheWormsUnited

I also know for a fact that sometimes, in what so called "old ip's" with several years and installations and owners, sometimes the IP's are blacklisted and/or flagged. Some hosting providers use the same IP address and hand it over to other clients. They basically format the machine and give the same machine to others, this means that the past history may follow you everywhere despite what you do with the machine, not saying this is the case in the post, but its a pretty good addon to the topic.

gacott

TheWormsUnited I have had all of these IPs for years, probably 5 years at this point now, we have around 500 of them. These same IPs were running a different panel, no issues. So we have some issues with the panel here. Hopefully the next update will solve these.

CQT

These are the main Ips from which the attacks originate, we should compare them to get closer to the matter. If possible all posts here then we can spear them in the next update right from the start.

"IP","Domain","Country","Region","City","ISP","ASN","Lat","Long","CNAME" "106.12.215.244","","China","","","Beijing Baidu Netcom Science and Technology Co., Ltd.","38365","34,7725","113,7266","" "111.229.78.120","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "112.35.62.225","","China","","","Guangdong Mobile Communication Co.Ltd.","9808","34,7725","113,7266","" "14.142.143.138","14.142.143.138.static-Mumbai.vsnl.net.in","India","Madhya Pradesh","Indore","TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP","4755","22,7163","75,8316","" "152.136.141.254","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "186.215.235.9","186.215.235.9.static.gvt.net.br","Brazil","Rio de Janeiro","Rio de Janeiro","TELEFONICA BRASIL S.A","18881","-22,9201","-43,3307","" "222.186.180.130","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.31.127","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "49.235.87.213","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.30.35","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "144.172.79.5","","United States","","","Boomer LTD","62203","37,751","-97,822","" "222.186.15.62","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "182.252.133.70","","South Korea","","","purplestones","38661","37,5112","126,9741","" "109.244.101.169","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "61.177.172.102","","China","Shanghai","Shanghai","Chinanet","4134","31,0449","121,4012","" "139.215.217.181","181.217.215.139.adsl-pool.jlccptt.net.cn","China","Jilin","Changchun","CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone","4837","43,88","125,3228","" "106.53.19.186","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "106.124.141.108","","China","","","CHINATELECOM Xinjiang Wulumuqi MAN network","137695","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.30.57","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "109.115.187.31","","Italy","Monza Brianza","Desio","Vodafone Italia S.p.A.","30722","45,614","9,1976","" "222.186.180.142","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.42.7","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.190.14","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "119.18.194.168","","China","","","IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation","23724","34,7725","113,7266","" "36.111.171.108","","China","","","Cloud Computing Corporation","58519","34,7725","113,7266","" "218.92.0.220","","China","Jiangsu","Xinpu","Chinanet","4134","34,5997","119,1594","" "222.186.42.136","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.31.83","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "112.17.184.171","","China","Zhejiang","Hangzhou","China Mobile communications corporation","56041","30,294","120,1619","" "193.70.12.219","ns3061461.ip-193-70-12.eu","France","","","OVH SAS","16276","48,8582","2,3387","" "93.146.233.226","net-93-146-233-226.cust.vodafonedsl.it","Italy","Milan","Milan","Vodafone Italia S.p.A.","30722","45,4707","9,1889","" "218.92.0.215","","China","Jiangsu","Xinpu","Chinanet","4134","34,5997","119,1594","" "94.172.225.26","94-172-225-26.dynamic.chello.pl","Poland","Mazovia","Warsaw","Liberty Global B.V.","6830","52,2088","21,0053","" "222.186.30.112","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.42.155","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "218.92.0.219","","China","Jiangsu","Xinpu","Chinanet","4134","34,5997","119,1594","" "222.186.30.76","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "111.229.176.206","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "218.92.0.221","","China","Jiangsu","Xinpu","Chinanet","4134","34,5997","119,1594","" "216.83.45.162","","United States","","","BGPNET Global ASN","64050","37,751","-97,822","" "218.92.0.223","","China","Jiangsu","Xinpu","Chinanet","4134","34,5997","119,1594","" "222.186.42.137","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.15.115","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "218.255.86.106","static.reserve.wtt.net.hk","Hong Kong","Tuen Mun","Tuen Mun","HKBN Enterprise Solutions HK Limited","9381","22,4","113,9833","" "115.78.4.219","","Vietnam","Ho Chi Minh","Ho Chi Minh City","Viettel Group","7552","10,8142","106,6438","" "222.186.31.166","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "181.30.99.114","114-99-30-181.fibertel.com.ar","Argentina","Buenos Aires F.D.","Buenos Aires","Telecom Argentina S.A.","10481","-34,6021","-58,3845","" "117.50.8.61","","China","","","China Unicom Beijing Province Network","4808","34,7725","113,7266","" "186.147.129.110","static-ip-186147129110.cable.net.co","Colombia","Departamento del Valle del Cauca","Santiago de Cali","Telmex Colombia S.A.","10620","3,4384","-76,5232","" "222.186.30.167","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "51.178.55.92","92.ip-51-178-55.eu","France","","","OVH SAS","16276","48,8582","2,3387","" "124.30.44.214","firewallgoa.unichemlabs.com","India","","","Sify Limited","9583","20,0063","77,006","" "220.78.28.68","","South Korea","Gyeonggi-do","Seongnam-si","Korea Telecom","4766","37,4388","127,1396","" "144.172.79.7","","United States","","","Boomer LTD","62203","37,751","-97,822","" "58.246.94.230","","China","Shanghai","Shanghai","China Unicom Shanghai network","17621","31,0449","121,4012","" "218.92.0.216","","China","Jiangsu","Xinpu","Chinanet","4134","34,5997","119,1594","" "37.49.224.39","","Estonia","","","Vitox Telecom","199264","59","26","" "85.209.0.103","","Russia","","","Chernyshov Aleksandr Aleksandrovich","202984","55,7386","37,6068","" "50.70.229.239","S0106105611a4b7a2.wp.shawcable.net","Canada","Manitoba","Winnipeg","SHAW","6327","49,9192","-97,1263","" "112.35.57.139","","China","","","Guangdong Mobile Communication Co.Ltd.","9808","34,7725","113,7266","" "82.118.236.186","","Bulgaria","Sofia-Capital","Sofia","Belcloud LTD","44901","42,683","23,3175","" "118.89.69.159","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "144.172.73.41","","United States","","","Boomer LTD","62203","37,751","-97,822","" "168.197.31.14","","Brazil","Para","Abaetetuba","silva souza comercio e servico de informatica ltda","264985","-1,7357","-48,9429","" "219.250.188.165","","South Korea","Seoul","Seoul","SK Broadband Co Ltd","9318","37,5985","126,9783","" "222.186.52.39","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "222.186.30.218","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "106.75.13.192","","China","","","China Unicom Beijing Province Network","4808","34,7725","113,7266","" "45.162.216.10","","Brazil","Ceara","Fortaleza","MR7 TELECOM LTDA - ME","268528","-3,7196","-38,5257","" "144.172.79.8","","United States","","","Boomer LTD","62203","37,751","-97,822","" "150.129.67.50","","India","West Bengal","Kolkata","Alliance Broadband Services Pvt. Ltd.","23860","22,5655","88,3653","" "120.201.125.204","","China","","","China Mobile communications corporation","56044","34,7725","113,7266","" "119.45.114.87","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "223.167.13.128","","China","Shanghai","Shanghai","China Unicom Shanghai network","17621","31,0449","121,4012","" "49.234.83.240","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "114.67.102.106","","China","","","China Telecom (Group)","4812","34,7725","113,7266","" "122.51.66.219","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "207.244.247.192","vmi418530.contaboserver.net","United States","Missouri","St Louis","CONTABO","40021","38,6364","-90,1985","" "128.199.100.254","","Singapore","","","DIGITALOCEAN-ASN","14061","1,314","103,6839","" "222.186.15.158","","China","","","AS Number for CHINANET jiangsu province backbone","23650","34,7725","113,7266","" "144.172.73.40","","United States","","","Boomer LTD","62203","37,751","-97,822","" "49.234.122.94","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "106.124.135.232","","China","","","CHINATELECOM Xinjiang Wulumuqi MAN network","137695","34,7725","113,7266","" "84.124.204.154","84.124.204.154.dyn.user.ono.com","Spain","Balearic Islands","Palma","Vodafone Ono, S.A.","6739","39,5661","2,6484","" "154.204.27.249","","Hong Kong","","","ICIDC NETWORK","136800","22,25","114,1667","" "205.185.115.40",".","United States","California","San Jose","PONYNET","53667","37,3387","-121,8914","" "180.250.248.169","","Indonesia","East Java","Kediri","PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia","7713","-7,8175","112,019","" "51.75.171.171","vps-e6d1b82f.vps.ovh.net","United Kingdom","Kingston upon Thames","Surbiton","OVH SAS","16276","51,3878","-0,2945","" "207.244.247.251","vmi419283.contaboserver.net","United States","Missouri","St Louis","CONTABO","40021","38,6364","-90,1985","" "37.49.224.65","cf.rootvpn.us","Estonia","","","Vitox Telecom","199264","59","26","" "121.204.185.106","106.185.204.121.broad.xm.fj.dynamic.163data.com.cn","China","","","Fuzhou","133774","34,7725","113,7266","" "205.185.123.139","gonazamenal.com","United States","California","San Jose","PONYNET","53667","37,3387","-121,8914","" "218.94.156.130","","China","Jiangsu","Nanjing","Chinanet","4134","32,0617","118,7778","" "159.65.158.30","","India","Karnataka","Bengaluru","DIGITALOCEAN-ASN","14061","12,9721","77,5933","" "1.204.116.48","","China","Guizhou","Guiyang","Chinanet","4134","26,5833","106,7167","" "107.170.104.125","www.jambcbttest.com","United States","New York","New York","DIGITALOCEAN-ASN","14061","40,7308","-73,9975","" "203.195.235.135","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "49.235.141.203","","China","","","Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited","45090","34,7725","113,7266","" "114.67.113.78","","China","","","China Telecom (Group)","4812","34,7725","113,7266","" "106.13.82.54","","China","","","Beijing Baidu Netcom Science and Technology Co., Ltd.","38365","34,7725","113,7266",""
With the ASN we can then stop these spinners

gacott

CQT Yep, we are seeing many of those same IPs. So, more proof it's panel issues. So good we are all working on this together. :-)

CQT

So for first aid we prepared and exported our firewall rule, which everyone can easily import via the sys firewall:

[{"id": 101, "types": "drop", "address": "106.13.82.54", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:19:13"}, {"id": 100, "types": "drop", "address": "114.67.113.78", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:18:59"}, {"id": 99, "types": "drop", "address": "49.235.141.203", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:18:44"}, {"id": 98, "types": "drop", "address": "203.195.235.135", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:18:30"}, {"id": 97, "types": "drop", "address": "107.170.104.125", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:18:14"}, {"id": 96, "types": "drop", "address": "1.204.116.48", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:17:59"}, {"id": 95, "types": "drop", "address": "159.65.158.30", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:17:45"}, {"id": 94, "types": "drop", "address": "218.94.156.130", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:17:31"}, {"id": 93, "types": "drop", "address": "205.185.123.139", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:17:17"}, {"id": 92, "types": "drop", "address": "121.204.185.106", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:17:02"}, {"id": 91, "types": "drop", "address": "37.49.224.65", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:16:49"}, {"id": 90, "types": "drop", "address": "207.244.247.251", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:15:24"}, {"id": 89, "types": "drop", "address": "51.75.171.171", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:15:10"}, {"id": 88, "types": "drop", "address": "180.250.248.169", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:14:55"}, {"id": 87, "types": "drop", "address": "205.185.115.40", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:14:42"}, {"id": 86, "types": "drop", "address": "154.204.27.249", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:14:28"}, {"id": 85, "types": "drop", "address": "84.124.204.154", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:14:14"}, {"id": 84, "types": "drop", "address": "106.124.135.232", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:14:00"}, {"id": 83, "types": "drop", "address": "49.234.122.94", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:13:46"}, {"id": 82, "types": "drop", "address": "144.172.73.40", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:13:30"}, {"id": 81, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.15.158", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:13:17"}, {"id": 80, "types": "drop", "address": "128.199.100.254", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:13:01"}, {"id": 79, "types": "drop", "address": "207.244.247.192", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:12:47"}, {"id": 78, "types": "drop", "address": "122.51.66.219", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:12:33"}, {"id": 77, "types": "drop", "address": "114.67.102.106", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:12:18"}, {"id": 76, "types": "drop", "address": "49.234.83.240", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:12:03"}, {"id": 75, "types": "drop", "address": "223.167.13.128", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:11:47"}, {"id": 74, "types": "drop", "address": "119.45.114.87", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:11:32"}, {"id": 73, "types": "drop", "address": "120.201.125.204", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:11:19"}, {"id": 72, "types": "drop", "address": "150.129.67.50", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:11:05"}, {"id": 71, "types": "drop", "address": "144.172.79.8", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:10:51"}, {"id": 70, "types": "drop", "address": "45.162.216.10", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:10:36"}, {"id": 69, "types": "drop", "address": "106.75.13.192", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:10:20"}, {"id": 68, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.30.218", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:10:06"}, {"id": 67, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.52.39", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:09:52"}, {"id": 66, "types": "drop", "address": "219.250.188.165", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:09:38"}, {"id": 65, "types": "drop", "address": "168.197.31.14", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:09:24"}, {"id": 64, "types": "drop", "address": "144.172.73.41", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:09:10"}, {"id": 63, "types": "drop", "address": "118.89.69.159", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:08:55"}, {"id": 62, "types": "drop", "address": "82.118.236.186", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:08:42"}, {"id": 61, "types": "drop", "address": "112.35.57.139", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:08:28"}, {"id": 60, "types": "drop", "address": "50.70.229.239", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:08:13"}, {"id": 59, "types": "drop", "address": "85.209.0.103", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:07:58"}, {"id": 58, "types": "drop", "address": "37.49.224.39", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:07:40"}, {"id": 57, "types": "drop", "address": "218.92.0.216", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:07:25"}, {"id": 56, "types": "drop", "address": "58.246.94.230", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:07:10"}, {"id": 55, "types": "drop", "address": "144.172.79.7", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:06:56"}, {"id": 54, "types": "drop", "address": "220.78.28.68", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:06:42"}, {"id": 53, "types": "drop", "address": "124.30.44.214", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:06:28"}, {"id": 52, "types": "drop", "address": "51.178.55.92", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:06:14"}, {"id": 51, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.30.167", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:05:15"}, {"id": 50, "types": "drop", "address": "186.147.129.110", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:05:02"}, {"id": 49, "types": "drop", "address": "117.50.8.61", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:02:00"}, {"id": 48, "types": "drop", "address": "181.30.99.114", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:01:35"}, {"id": 47, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.31.166", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 18:01:20"}, {"id": 46, "types": "drop", "address": "115.78.4.219", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:59:43"}, {"id": 45, "types": "drop", "address": "218.255.86.106", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:59:27"}, {"id": 44, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.15.115", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:59:13"}, {"id": 43, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.42.137", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:59:00"}, {"id": 42, "types": "drop", "address": "218.92.0.223", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:58:46"}, {"id": 41, "types": "drop", "address": "216.83.45.162", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:58:32"}, {"id": 40, "types": "drop", "address": "218.92.0.221", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:58:18"}, {"id": 39, "types": "drop", "address": "111.229.176.206", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:53:37"}, {"id": 38, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.30.76", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:53:24"}, {"id": 37, "types": "drop", "address": "218.92.0.219", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:53:05"}, {"id": 36, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.42.155", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:52:51"}, {"id": 35, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.30.112", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:52:02"}, {"id": 34, "types": "drop", "address": "94.172.225.26", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:51:49"}, {"id": 33, "types": "drop", "address": "218.92.0.215", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:51:33"}, {"id": 32, "types": "drop", "address": "93.146.233.226", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:51:19"}, {"id": 31, "types": "drop", "address": "193.70.12.219", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:51:05"}, {"id": 30, "types": "drop", "address": "112.17.184.171", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:50:51"}, {"id": 29, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.31.83", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:50:37"}, {"id": 28, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.42.136", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:50:22"}, {"id": 27, "types": "drop", "address": "218.92.0.220", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:50:08"}, {"id": 26, "types": "drop", "address": "36.111.171.108", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:49:55"}, {"id": 25, "types": "drop", "address": "119.18.194.168", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:49:42"}, {"id": 24, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.190.14", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:49:28"}, {"id": 23, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.42.7", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:49:13"}, {"id": 22, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.180.142", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:48:59"}, {"id": 21, "types": "drop", "address": "109.115.187.31", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:48:45"}, {"id": 20, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.30.57", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:47:16"}, {"id": 19, "types": "drop", "address": "106.124.141.108", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:47:02"}, {"id": 18, "types": "drop", "address": "139.215.217.181", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:44:14"}, {"id": 17, "types": "drop", "address": "61.177.172.102", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:44:01"}, {"id": 16, "types": "drop", "address": "109.244.101.169", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:43:46"}, {"id": 15, "types": "drop", "address": "182.252.133.70", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:43:33"}, {"id": 14, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.15.62", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:43:18"}, {"id": 13, "types": "drop", "address": "144.172.79.5", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:43:04"}, {"id": 12, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.30.35", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:42:49"}, {"id": 11, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.31.127", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:38:46"}, {"id": 10, "types": "drop", "address": "222.186.180.130", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:38:31"}, {"id": 9, "types": "drop", "address": "186.215.235.9", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:38:18"}, {"id": 8, "types": "drop", "address": "152.136.141.254", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:38:03"}, {"id": 7, "types": "drop", "address": "14.142.143.138", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:37:48"}, {"id": 6, "types": "drop", "address": "112.35.62.225", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:37:33"}, {"id": 5, "types": "drop", "address": "111.229.78.120", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:37:18"}, {"id": 4, "types": "drop", "address": "106.12.215.244", "brief": "", "addtime": "2020-07-17 17:36:57"}, {"id": 3, "types": "drop", "address": "23.129.64.0/24", "brief": "hacking", "addtime": "2020-07-11 11:42:22"}, {"id": 2, "types": "drop", "address": "89.248.168.0-89.248.168.255", "brief": "Hacking", "addtime": "2020-07-10 12:50:58"}, {"id": 1, "types": "drop", "address": "212.70.149.0-212.70.149.255", "brief": "212.70.149.0-212.70.149.255", "addtime": "2020-07-09 18:06:25"}]

So for first aid we prepared and exported our firewall rule, which everyone can easily import via the sys firewall

Copy content as and save as ip.json
and import

gacott

CQT This just fixes one issue though, on the server side, from a provider side (OVH) these are still coming at the IP. We need to find the source more so then block the bad guys.

klaus

CQT You can't run a regex to get only the ip's so i lost 10 seconds to do that for you.

106.13.82.54
114.67.113.78
49.235.141.203
203.195.235.135
107.170.104.125
1.204.116.48
159.65.158.30
218.94.156.130
205.185.123.139
121.204.185.106
37.49.224.65
207.244.247.251
51.75.171.171
180.250.248.169
205.185.115.40
154.204.27.249
84.124.204.154
106.124.135.232
49.234.122.94
144.172.73.40
222.186.15.158
128.199.100.254
207.244.247.192
122.51.66.219
114.67.102.106
49.234.83.240
223.167.13.128
119.45.114.87
120.201.125.204
150.129.67.50
144.172.79.8
45.162.216.10
106.75.13.192
222.186.30.218
222.186.52.39
219.250.188.165
168.197.31.14
144.172.73.41
118.89.69.159
82.118.236.186
112.35.57.139
50.70.229.239
85.209.0.103
37.49.224.39
218.92.0.216
58.246.94.230
144.172.79.7
220.78.28.68
124.30.44.214
51.178.55.92
222.186.30.167
186.147.129.110
117.50.8.61
181.30.99.114
222.186.31.166
115.78.4.219
218.255.86.106
222.186.15.115
222.186.42.137
218.92.0.223
216.83.45.162
218.92.0.221
111.229.176.206
222.186.30.76
218.92.0.219
222.186.42.155
222.186.30.112
94.172.225.26
218.92.0.215
93.146.233.226
193.70.12.219
112.17.184.171
222.186.31.83
222.186.42.136
218.92.0.220
36.111.171.108
119.18.194.168
222.186.190.14
222.186.42.7
222.186.180.142
109.115.187.31
222.186.30.57
106.124.141.108
139.215.217.181
61.177.172.102
109.244.101.169
182.252.133.70
222.186.15.62
144.172.79.5
222.186.30.35
222.186.31.127
222.186.180.130
186.215.235.9
152.136.141.254
14.142.143.138
112.35.62.225
111.229.78.120
106.12.215.244
23.129.64.0
89.248.168.0
89.248.168.255
212.70.149.0
212.70.149.255
212.70.149.0
212.70.149.255

And i make enough time to upload a list with the ip's tested.

https://we.tl/t-iTQ8A105T8

How are this ip's from BT panel when are random countries? And mostly are clean ip's not even fucking VPN's.

If someone would want to steal data will do it on long run and over vpn's you know is smarter that way.

CQT

I / We and my employees are in the process of working something out, but it still takes a little time.

As we can see, the firewall and geoip must still be worked on, before aapanel is installed, a proxy must be set up to run the installation. so the ips can no longer be stretched.

CQT

Furthermore, not all countries blockages are accepted by the sys-firewall, there are some problems that have to be fixed beforehand.

@aaPanel_Jose:

Suggestion! Connect the sys firewall and geoip under one tab. Write Config in such a way that both get the DB from one source (folder) and can access it at the same time. Furthermore, the IP and the entire IP range are queried, which can then be blocked using a button, but which the user can decide for himself whether only the individual IP (Geoip is blocked or the entire network of the IP operator). Then integrate the NGINX firewall into the whole. Because on the one hand it is very confusing, and I also think that everything does not work together so harmoniously.

A good approach can be found here: https://gist.github.com/Pandry/21fc0e30abbfd0579ec69c491b99a446

as I said, just an approach!

In addition, the purchased DB from https://www.ipdeny.com/ are outdated and have not been maintained since 2014.

aaPanel_Jose

CQT
I checked the installation script, it just visits a url on aapanel, then aapanel gets the client ip and records it

I tried to enable HTTPS for the requested URL. Can you help me see if there are any attacks after normal installation?

In addition, you only need to allow server access, *.aapanel.com *.bt.cn, all functions of the panel can work

aaP_admin64

CQT

Ip DB from https://www.ipdeny.com/ are not outdated and updated on Sat Dec 4 12:05:34 UTC 2021

How may I import to the list or to Centos 7 Iptables those files lists?

https://www.ipdeny.com/ipblocks/data/countries/all-zones.tar.gz
and https://www.ipdeny.com/ipv6/ipaddresses/blocks/ipv6-all-zones.tar.gz

aaP_admin64

CQT Suggestion! Connect the sys firewall and geoip under one tab. Write Config in such a way that both get the DB from one source (folder) and can access it at the same time. Furthermore, the IP and the entire IP range are queried, which can then be blocked using a button, but which the user can decide for himself whether only the individual IP (Geoip is blocked or the entire network of the IP operator). Then integrate the NGINX firewall into the whole. Because on the one hand it is very confusing, and I also think that everything does not work together so harmoniously.

Which is the full procedure to integrate them all?

Thank you very much

gacott

aaPanel_Jose What are we still getting from *.bt.cn? There is no way to move that stuff off of them and onto somewhere else?

CQT

aaPanel_Jose hello two minutes after the installation the attacks started, not with the ips from node.json, but from the same network operator. We left out the proxy and firewall to see if anything changes and nothing changes. So we can assume that the download requests at the node will be used to track and record the IPS. you have to make sure that the node from bt.cn can no longer be used, we are already trying to load the stuff from the node, but are currently facing problems with it, we had to host the whole thing ourselves, so one clean installation would be possible! So everything that is necessary from the node must be cleaned on another server and first. otherwise aaPanel cannot become what you / your want to achieve. It would also be an absolute risk since all server clients would be contaminated by customers.

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